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oped between 1987 and 2013 and show that these techniques can be reduced to only 11 different patterns.
Moreover, the majority (69.7%) of techniques can be categorized in only four different patterns, i.e. most
of the techniques we surveyed are very similar. We represent the patterns in a hierarchical catalog using
a pattern language. Our pattern catalog will serve as a base for future covert channel novelty evaluation.
Furthermore, we apply the concept of pattern variations to network covert channels. With pattern varia-
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adapted to other network protocols. We also propose the pattern-based covert channel optimizations pattern
hopping and pattern combination. Finally, we lay the foundation for pattern-based countermeasures: While
many current countermeasures were developed for specific channels, a pattern-oriented approach allows to
apply one countermeasure to multiple channels. Hence, future countermeasure development can focus on
patterns, and the development of real-world protection against covert channels is greatly simplified.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Covert channels represent unforeseen communication methods that break security
policies [Lampson 1973]. Network covert channels transfer information through net-
works in ways that hide the fact that communication takes place (hidden information
transfer). They are used in scenarios where normal communication is too revealing
and just using encryption is not sufficient.
Author’s addresses: S. Wendzel, Fraunhofer Institute for Communication, Information Processing and Er-
gonomics FKIE, Bonn, Germany; S. Zander, Centre for Advanced Internet Architectures, Swinburne Uni-
versity of Technology, Melbourne, Australia; B. Fechner, University of Augsburg, Department of Systems
and Networking, Augsburg, Germany; C. Herdin, University of Rostock, Department of Computer Science,
Rostock, Germany
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted
without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that
copies show this notice on the first page or initial screen of a display along with the full citation. Copyrights
for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is per-
mitted. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers, to redistribute to lists, or to use any component
of this work in other works requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Permissions may be requested
from Publications Dept., ACM, Inc., 2 Penn Plaza, Suite 701, New York, NY 10121-0701 USA, fax +1 (212)
869-0481, or permissions@acm.org.
c© 2014 ACM 0360-0300/2014/-ART1 $15.00
DOI:http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000



















1:2 S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.
Network covert channels are considered a serious threat to Internet users [Gianvec-
chio and Wang 2007], because they can be used to hide command and control traffic of
botnets, to coordinate DDoS attacks, to hide military and secret service communica-
tions, and to secretly leak sensitive data [Lucena et al. 2006; Zander et al. 2007]. On
the other hand, network covert channels are a dual-use good and can prevent illicit in-
formation transferred by journalists or whistle-blowers from being detected, and thus
support the freedom of speech in networks with censorship [Zander et al. 2007].
Today’s hiding techniques embed hidden information either
1. in protocol data units (PDUs), e.g. in unused or reserved header elements (some-
times also called header fields),
2. or through the timing of PDUs or protocol commands, e.g. by encoding a hidden
message as a sequence of inter-arrival times or as a manipulated packet order.
A large amount of research was accomplished within the last decades to evaluate
attributes of network protocols (e.g. IPv4, IPv6, TCP, and HTTP) regarding their po-
tential to hide information. On the other hand, only little work exists on providing a
general, protocol-independent approach. Although coarse categorizations of network
covert channel techniques exist [Zander et al. 2007; Meadows and Moskowitz 1996;
Shen et al. 2005; Llamas et al. 2005; Zhiyong and Yong 2009], no comprehensive and
current catalog of the existing techniques is available.
Moreover, current techniques to counter network covert channels focus on single
covert channels instead of common characteristics of multiple channels. The combi-
nation of dozens of countermeasures is required to achieve an acceptable protection,
which is problematic in practice.
We consider a taxonomy for covert channel techniques very important in order to
provide a framework to classify current and future research in the field, to determine
similarities between techniques and to streamline the identification of novel counter-
measures.
Patterns are a universal technique, which can be used to create taxonomies in a
generic manner [Fincher et al. 2003]. In particular, the Pattern Language Markup
Language (PLML) provides a consistent formalization of pattern descriptions and is
the standard pattern language in the human computer interaction field [Fincher et al.
2003].
We apply the approach of pattern languages to network covert channels, extract
common patterns for hiding techniques and combine them in a novel hierarchy. In
comparison to existing taxonomy approaches, we also cover recent covert channels
from 2009 to 2013. The focus of our pattern catalog is less on technical aspects but on
the common abstract behavior of covert channel techniques, which is also a difference
to existing categorizations.
We describe the identified covert channel patterns using an extensible PLML-based
pattern catalog. Our catalog simplifies the future classification and novelty evaluation
of upcoming covert channels. Only hiding techniques which require the integration of
a new pattern into the catalog are very novel, others are simply variations of existing
patterns. We show that the surveyed techniques can be reduced to only 11 different
patterns. Moreover, the majority (69.7%) of techniques can be categorized in only four
different patterns, i.e. most of the covert channel techniques we surveyed are very sim-
ilar. Furthermore, our pattern catalog represents a systematic approach for identifying
network covert channels in protocols in order to overcome the problem of requiring an
exhaustive search [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
In addition, we present the idea of pattern variation. Pattern variation is based on
pattern transformation [Engel et al. 2011; Engel et al. 2013], which allows authors and
developers to alter the existing context of a pattern. For instance, a desktop browser
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interface pattern can be transformed to a user interface pattern for mobile devices and
vice versa, i.e. the context changes from desktop to a mobile device [Engel et al. 2011].
Pattern variation is the first transformation-like approach for covert channels. We
define the utilized network protocol as the pattern’s context. Thus, a pattern’s applica-
tion can change from one network protocol to another – without re-implementing the
hiding technique itself.
We also explain the improvement of pattern-based covert channels by introducing
the concepts of pattern combination and pattern hopping. Pattern combination allows
to use multiple patterns at the same time (e.g. for a single network packet or frame) to
increase throughput while pattern hopping randomizes the use of patterns over time
to increase stealthiness.
Furthermore, we motivate the development of countermeasures for network covert
channels based on patterns. With patterns, covert channel protection in practice will
become more realistic as the number of required countermeasures can be reduced
greatly by targeting hiding techniques represented through generic patterns instead
of aiming at specific hiding techniques.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 covers fundamen-
tals of network covert channels and discusses previous taxonomies while Section 3
explains the concept of patterns and their use in our taxonomy. We introduce the iden-
tified covert channel patterns and our hierarchical pattern catalog in Section 4 and
present our concept of pattern variation in Section 5. Section 6 motivates and dis-
cusses pattern-based countermeasures. A conclusion follows in Section 7.
2. COVERT CHANNEL FUNDAMENTALS AND RELATED WORK
First, we provide background information on network covert channels and afterwards
discuss previous work on the categorization of covert channels.
2.1. Covert Channels
This section provides some background on covert channels and introduces the termi-
nology used in the rest of the article.
2.1.1. History. Covert channels were introduced by Lampson in 1973 and represent a
technique for security policy-breaking communication that was not foreseen by a sys-
tem designer [Lampson 1973; Murdoch 2007]. Covert channels became an important
topic in the military context where a high-security process having sensitive informa-
tion (the HIGH process) must be prevented from leaking information to a process with
lower security (the LOW process) through covert channels [Ogurtsov et al. 1996]. For
instance, a LOW process classified as “SECRET” should not be capable to access “TOP
SECRET” data from a HIGH process.
Initially, the research community focussed on local covert channels – covert chan-
nels that can be used to leak data from a HIGH process to a LOW process on the same
system. With the rise of computer networks starting from the early 1990’s, the focus
shifted towards network covert channels. Network covert channels encode hidden data
in network protocols (also referred to as overt channels). For network covert channels,
the focus is not solely on establishing a policy-breaking communication anymore. They
are more broadly viewed as approaches to provide a hidden communication channel
[Millen 1999]. Traditionally, network covert channels were classified as storage chan-
nels, which encode hidden data in protocol fields, and timing channels, which hide
information by manipulating the timing of frames, packets, or messages.
Fisk et al. distinguish between unstructured and structured carriers for hiding tech-
niques [Fisk et al. 2003]. Unstructurred carriers are human-interpretable and placed
into the payload of network packets (e.g. audio or video streaming content). Our work
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concentrates on structured, i.e. machine-interpretable, carriers such as network pro-
tocol headers.
2.1.2. Adversary Scenario. Simmons introduced the so-called Prisoner’s Problem in
1983 [Simmons 1983]. Alice and Bob are kept in prison cells, separated from each
other, and want to cooperate in order to escape from jail. The only way for Alice and
Bob to exchange messages is to give the messages to the warden Walter. Walter can
read all messages exchanged between both prisoners. He decides whether he delivers
or manipulates a message and can even forge messages. Alice and Bob therefore need
to use a hidden communication which Walter is not aware of, i.e. a covert channel,
to achieve their goal. For instance, the prisoners could alter the row pitch between
written lines in letters they hand to the warden.
In the context of covert channels, an adversary is either active or passive. A passive
adversary, or passive warden, tries to determine the presence of a network covert chan-
nel and to extract the embedded message or to prove the involvement of a party in the
covert communication [Pfitzmann 1996]. An active adversary, or active warden, can
also try to modify the covert communication by removing or blocking elements within
the data transfer or inserting its own (bogus) messages into the channel [Pfitzmann
1996; Craver 1998].
2.1.3. Channel Noise. In general, all covert channels can be noisy since network frames
or packets of the overt channels can be reordered, modified or lost, which can lead
to bit errors or bit deletions/erasures in the covert channel. However, storage chan-
nels exploit the fact that overt protocols, such as TCP, have mechanisms for reliable
data transport. If the header fields in which the covert channels are encoded are not
changed in the network, these channels are effectively noise-free. Timing channels on
the other hand are always noisy, since the network always affects the timing of frames,
packets or messages depending on the network conditions (e.g. congestion).
Active wardens (e.g. traffic normalizers) may also introduce noise. However, we do
not consider this type of noise as part of the covert channel characteristics.
2.1.4. Network Covert Channels. The majority of the network covert channels proposed
early were storage channels, for example Girling proposed embedding hidden informa-
tion in address fields [Girling 1987] and Rowland suggested embedding covert chan-
nels in different unused areas in the IPv4 header and in the TCP header [Rowland
1997]. Storage channels are easy to use, as the header fields used are not modified
inside the network and hence there is limited channel noise. However, most of these
channels are also easy to detect and eliminate.
A few timing channels were proposed early on, for example Wolf presented a covert
channel based on the timing of message acknowledgements [Wolf 1989]. However, tim-
ing channels have only received more attention in recent years, for example Cabuk et
al. proposed to encode covert data into varying packet rates over time [Cabuk 2006]
and Berk et al. proposed to encode covert bits by manipulating the gaps between con-
secutive packets (inter-packet gaps) [V. Berk 2005]. Timing channels are harder to use
and always noisy, but they are also harder to detect and to eliminate.
Network covert channels can either be active by generating their own traffic or can
piggyback on traffic created by a third party [Rutkowska 2004; Shah et al. 2006] to
increase the channel’s covertness.
2.2. Related Work
We now describe existing surveys and classifications of network covert channels, and
how our novel pattern-based classification improves on these.
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An early taxonomy of covert channels in multilevel security systems (MLS) was pre-
sented by Meadows and Moskowitz [Meadows and Moskowitz 1996]. Covert channels
were associated with four different contexts based on the service conditions in which
they occur: High-to-low service covert channels, low-to-high service covert channels,
shared service covert channels, and incomparable service covert channels. The tax-
onomy in [Meadows and Moskowitz 1996] concentrates on early covert channel tech-
niques that break security policies but do not necessarily provide stealthy communi-
cation. Our work focuses on network covert channels and on their hiding techniques
instead of the service conditions in which they appear.
Shen et al. classified local covert channels and proposed the idea to counter local
covert channels based on their characteristics [Shen et al. 2005]. In comparison, our
work discusses network covert channels and provides a hierarchical and more exten-
sive categorization.
Llamas et al. surveyed covert channels in Internet protocols [Llamas et al. 2005].
The first part of the paper covers fundamentals of covert channel research for both,
local and network covert channels. The second part summarizes publications on net-
work covert storage and timing channels in TCP/IP protocols. However, [Llamas et al.
2005] merely lists the different covert channels and makes no attempt to categorize
them.
In 2007, Zander et al. [Zander et al. 2007] published a comprehensive survey on
network covert channels. The work covers the terminology, adversary scenario, covert
channel techniques and countermeasures. Moreover, a categorization is applied which
differs between channels taking advantage of unused header bits, header extensions
and padding, the IP Identifier and the Fragment Offset, the TCP Initial Sequence
Number (ISN), checksum fields, the Time to Live (TTL) field, the modulation of address
fields and packet lengths, the modulation of timestamp fields, packet rate and tim-
ing, message sequence timing, packet loss and packet sorting, frame collisions, ad-hoc
routing protocol-based techniques, Wireless LAN techniques, HTTP- and DNS-based
techniques, application layer protocol-based channels and payload tunneling. The cat-
egorization in [Zander et al. 2007] is fine-grained: channels are not only categorized
by their underlying technique, but also by the protocol layer they operate on. Also,
[Zander et al. 2007] does not provide a hierarchy or a standardized pattern definition.
Zhiyong and Yong proposed a taxonomy based on entropy, and their work is the clos-
est to our own [Zhiyong and Yong 2009]. Each channel falls into one out of three cat-
egories depending on the ‘source’ used to encode the covert data: variety entropy, con-
stant entropy or fixed entropy. As in our own work, [Zhiyong and Yong 2009] motivates
the development of prevention techniques with a focus on covert channel categories
instead of single techniques. We propose a hierarchical and more fine-grained catego-
rization, which is not based on entropy but on the actual hiding techniques. While the
development of more detailed and particular countermeasures for the provided classi-
fication was left for future work in [Zhiyong and Yong 2009], our categorization enables
more practical countermeasures that can address covert channel patterns.
We define an improved network covert channel taxonomy based on PLML/1.1 pat-
terns and present the concepts of pattern variation, pattern combination and pat-
tern hopping. Pattern variation allows the adaption of one hiding technique to arbi-
trary network protocols. Pattern combination allows to simultaneously use multiple
patterns for a single PDU (e.g. a single network packet) or for a sequence of PDUs,
while pattern hopping randomizes multiple pattern-based covert channels to improve
stealthiness. Pattern hopping enables a channel to adapt itself to changing conditions
in networks (e.g. switching to another pattern if one pattern is blocked). Another ad-
vantage over the existing surveys is the fact that we include recent publications from
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 1, Publication date: 2014.
1:6 S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.
2009 to 2013 into our categorization. Besides presenting the patterns, we also discuss
countermeasures in the context of the identified patterns.
3. PATTERN-RELATED FUNDAMENTALS AND THEIR TAXONOMY USE
After introducing fundamentals and related work on covert channels, we now cover
the fundamentals of patterns and pattern languages. Moreover,we describe our use of
PLML.
3.1. Patterns and Pattern Languages
Graphical notations like UML 2.0 are powerful modeling languages for the descrip-
tion of specifications and the subsequent documentation [Object Management Group
(OMG) 2010] but only represent the end result of the design process. Since the late 70s
patterns, in comparison, enable the successful documentation of design decisions dur-
ing the development process. In 1977, Alexander introduced first design patterns for
solving problems in architecture and urban planning [Alexander et al. 1977]. Eighteen
years later, the Gang of Four (GoF) transferred the pattern concept to the domains of
software architecture and software engineering [Gamma et al. 1994]. Today, patterns
are also used in fields of human computer interaction (HCI) research [Fincher et al.
2003], usability engineering [Marcus 2004], user experience [Tiedtke et al. 2005], task
modeling [Gaffar et al. 2004], and application security [Yoder and Barcalow 1997].
As shown in Fig. 1, all patterns represent a relation between a certain design prob-
lem and a solution in a given context. The problem is a description of the issue to
be solved. The solution refers to a specific design that solves the given problem. The
context describes a repetitious set of cases in which the pattern can be used.
The use of patterns has a number of advantages [Seffah 2010]: patterns are simple
and easily readable for designers, developers and researchers, and they are useful for
the collaboration between the people involved. Furthermore, patterns are based on
established knowledge and capture fundamental principles for good designs. Patterns
also specify requirements in a general way that allows different implementations of
the same pattern.
3.2. Utilization of PLML for a Covert Channel-based Taxonomy
In order to ensure a certain standard, patterns are summarized in a so-called pattern
catalog [Alexander et al. 1977]. A catalog of related patterns that belong to a common
domain is a so-called pattern language [Seffah 2010]. Today, widely accepted pattern
catalogs exist in the field of HCI, such as the catalogs presented by van Welie [van
Welie 2001], Tidwell [Tidwell 2009], and van Duyne [Van Duyne et al. 2007]. However,
these pattern catalogs are described in different styles.
To enable the clear definition and comparison of patterns, so-called schemes were
introduced [Alexander et al. 1977]. These schemes are divided into sections of textual













Fig. 1. The concept of patterns
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attributes existed, as numerous pattern catalogs were created, based on a different
understanding of attributes. Due to these inconsistencies, searching and referencing
patterns across different catalogs is difficult. To overcome this problem, a standardized
pattern language was developed based on XML: the Pattern Language Markup Lan-
guage (PLML) v. 1.1 [Fincher et al. 2003]. PLML unifies and standardizes the schemes
of different authors with the help of XML tags. Each XML tag represents a part of the
scheme. Tab. I describes the tags from the PLML 1.1 we used to define covert channel
patterns.
Table I. Used PLML/1.1 Attributes
Tag Description
<pattern id> Identifies a pattern within the particular catalog.
<name> A correct assignment of a name for each pattern is important for the retrieval of a
pattern when the pattern becomes part of a second catalog.
<alias> Patterns can have different names, which are specified in the <alias> tag.
The alias tag helps to find the same pattern when the pattern has different names
in different catalogs.
<illustration> An application scenario for the pattern.
<context> Specifies the situations to which the pattern can be applied.
<solution> Describes the solution for a problem to which the pattern can be applied.
The attributes problem and context (cf. Fig. 1) are usually blurred but often not
separated into two attributes.
<evidence> Contains additional details about the pattern and its design. Moreover, the tag can
contain examples for known uses of the pattern.
<literature> Lists references to publications related to the pattern.
<implementation> Introduces existing implementations, code fragments or implementational.
4. CLASSIFICATION OF COVERT CHANNEL PATTERNS BY USING PLML
We evaluated the covert channel research of the last decades and classified the 109
evaluated covert channel techniques into 11 abstract patterns.
4.1. Coverage of Techniques
To select the most significant covert channel techniques for our pattern catalog, we
took the existing surveys by Llamas et al. [Llamas et al. 2005], Zander et al. [Zander
et al. 2007] and Zhiyong and Yong [Zhiyong and Yong 2009] into account and included
the referenced publications in our evaluation. Moreover, we cover additional papers
with a significant amount of citations or novelty that were not mentioned in the sur-
veys (e.g. because of their later publication between 2009 and 2013).
4.2. Pattern List
We now describe all patterns. For better readability, in the following textual presen-
tation of the pattern catalog we merged the content of the literature and evidence at-
tributes in the evidence attribute and removed pattern attributes from PLML which
are either redundant or not pertinent to our contribution. Some papers propose var-
ious techniques belonging to the same pattern (e.g. [Lucena et al. 2006] presents 10
hiding techniques forming part of the Add Redundancy pattern). In such cases, we do
not mention all techniques explicitly.
For some patterns less than three use cases exist in the literature. In such cases, we
added our own ideas for hiding techniques to provide a minimum of three use cases.
Our hiding techniques have no citation, as they are initially proposed in this paper.
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P1. Size Modulation Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel uses the size of a header element or of a PDU to encode
the hidden message.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying
Evidence:
1. Modulation of data block length in LAN frames [Girling 1987]
2. Modulation of padding field’s size in IEEE 802.3 frames [Wolf 1989]
3. Modulation of IP fragment sizes [Murdoch and Lewis 2005; Mazurczyk and
Szczypiorski 2012]
4. Modulate the message length of network packets [Ji et al. 2009]
5. Modulate the size of IPSec messages [Sadeghi et al. 2012]
6. A man-in-the-middle adversary between VPN sites actively manipulates the
maximum transmission unit (MTU) within the path MTU discovery process be-
tween the VPN sites. Path MTU discovery is a continous process and changed
MTUs are propagated to systems within the VPN site, i.e. allow to encode hidden
information within the MTU [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
P2. Sequence Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel alters the sequence of header/PDU elements to encode
hidden information.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying
Evidence:
1. Sequence of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) header fields [Dyatlov and
Castro 2005]
2. Sequence of Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) options [Rios et al.
2012]
3. Sequence of File Transfer Protocol (FTP) commands [Zou et al. 2005]
P2.a. Position Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel alters the position of a given header/PDU element to
encode hidden information.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying → Sequence
Evidence:
1. Position of an IPv4 option in the options list of an IPv4 packet
2. Position of an IPv6 extension header in the list of extension headers
3. Position of a DHCP option in the options list [Rios et al. 2012]
P2.b. Number of Elements Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel encodes hidden information by the number of head-
er/PDU elements transferred.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying → Sequence
Evidence:
1. Alter the number of options placed in an IPv4 packet
2. Modulate the number of options placed in a DHCP packet [Rios et al. 2012]
3. Modulate the number of fragments created from an original IP packet [Mazur-
czyk and Szczypiorski 2012]
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P3. Add Redundancy Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel creates new space within a given header element or
within a PDU to hide data into.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying
Evidence:
1. Generation of packets with IPv4 options that embed hidden data [Trabelsi and
Jawhar 2010]
2. Create a new IPv6 destination option with embedded hidden data [Graf 2003]
3. Extend HTTP headers with additional fields or extend values of existing fields
[Dyatlov and Castro 2005]
4. Manipulate the pointer and length values for the IPv4 record route option to
create space for data hiding [Trabelsi and Jawhar 2010]
5. Add random bytes to an encrypted SSH message [Lucena et al. 2004]
6. Extend Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) packet headers with additional
fields [Getchell 2008]
7. Hide data in unused bits of the DHCP chaddr field if the hlen field is set to a
value that is larger than the size of a network address [Rios et al. 2012]
8. Encapsulate IP packets with a smaller size than specified in the Ethernet frame
size and use the space between the end of the IP packet and the Ethernet trailer
for covert data [Muchene et al. 2013]
9. Encode hidden information through the presence/absence of “type” or “xml:lang”
attributes in the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) or through
the presence of leading/trailing white spaces in XMPP messages [Patuck and
Hernandez-Castro 2013]
P4. PDU Corruption/Loss Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel generates corrupted PDUs that contain hidden data
or actively utilizes packet loss to signal hidden information.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Modifying
Evidence:
1. Generate corrupted messages in broadcast erasure channels [Servetto and Vet-
terli 2001]
2. Transfer corrupted frames in IEEE 802.11 [Kraetzer et al. 2006]
3. A man-in-the-middle adversary between two VPN sites drops selected packets
exchanged between the VPN sites to introduce covert information into an estab-
lished connection of adversaries located within the VPN sites [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
P5. Random Value Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel embeds hidden data in a header element containing a
“random” value.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Preserving → Modification of an Attribute
Evidence:
1. Utilize the IPv4 Identifier field [Rowland 1997]
2. Utilize the first sequence number of a TCP connection – the Inital Sequence
Number (ISN) [Rowland 1997; Rutkowska 2004]
3. Hide data in the TCP ISN using a bounce server [Rowland 1997]
4. Utilize the DHCP xid field [Rios et al. 2012]
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 1, Publication date: 2014.
1:10 S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.
5. Utilize the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol Message Authentication Code (MAC
field) [Lucena et al. 2004]
Notes: As some header elements, such as the TCP ISN, follow a distribution which
conforms to a particular operating system or context, their values cannot be con-
sidered perfectly random and the placement of “random” values in such elements
can lead to different value distributions, which can be detected [Murdoch 2007].
P6. Value Modulation Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel selects one of n values a header element can contain
to encode a hidden message.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Preserving → Modification of an Attribute
Evidence:
1. Send a frame to one of n available Ethernet addresses in the local network
[Girling 1987]
2. Encode information by n of the possible IP header Time-to-live (TTL) values
(e.g. a high or a low TTL value) [Zander et al. 2006]
3. Encode information by n of the possible Hop Limit values in the IPv6 header
[Lucena et al. 2006]
4. Encode information by sending a packet using one of n possible application layer
protocols [Wendzel and Zander 2012] or application layer ports [Borland 2008]
5. Encode information by selecting one of n possible messages types in the Build-
ing Automation and Control Networking (BACnet) protocol [Wendzel et al. 2012]
6. Encode information in the target IP of address resolution protocol (ARP) mes-
sages [Ji et al. 2010]
7. Change the value of the “type” or “xml:lang” attributes in XMPP [Patuck and
Hernandez-Castro 2013]
8. Send IPSec packets from one VPN site to specific destination IPs within another
VPN site [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
P6.a. Case Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel uses case-modification of letters in header elements to
encode hidden data.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Preserving → Modification of an Attribute → Value Modulation
Evidence:
1. Case modification in HTTP headers [Dyatlov and Castro 2005]
2. Modify the case of the “type” or “id” attributes in XMPP [Patuck and Hernandez-
Castro 2013]
3. Case modification in SMTP, Post Office Protocol (POP3), or Network News
Transfer Protocol (NNTP), commands and headers
P6.b. Least Significant Bit (LSB) Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel uses the least significant bit(s) of header elements to
encode hidden data.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Preserving → Modification of an Attribute → Value Modulation
Evidence:
1. Encode into the IPv4 timestamp option by effectively sending at even/odd times
[Handel and Sandford 1996]
2. Modify the low order bits of the timestamp option in TCP [Giffin et al. 2003]
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3. Utilize the least significant bits of the secs field in the DHCP header [Rios et al.
2012]
4. Encode covert bits in slight modifications of view angles (yaw, pitch) of player’s
avatars in the Quake3 multiplayer game protocol [Zander et al. 2008]
5. Utilize the least significant bits of the IPv4 TTL field
6. Utilize the least significant bits of the IPv6 Hop Limit field [Lucena et al. 2006]
7. Utilize the least significant bits of the Hop Count field in the network layer PDU
of the BACnet protocol
8. Utilize the least significant bits of the “id” attribute in XMPP [Patuck and
Hernandez-Castro 2013]
P7. Reserved/Unused Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel encoded hidden data into a reserved or unused head-
er/PDU element.
Context: Network Covert Storage Channels → Modification of Non-Payload → Struc-
ture Preserving → Modification of an Attribute
Evidence:
1. Utilize undefined/reserved bits in IEEE 802.5/data link layer frames [Wolf 1989;
Handel and Sandford 1996]
2. Utilize unused fields in IPv4, e.g. Identifier field, Don’t Fragment (DF) flag or
the reserved flag, as well as in IP-IP encapsulation [Handel and Sandford 1996;
Ahsan and Kundur 2002; Buchanan and Llamas 2004; Sadeghi et al. 2012]
3. Encode hidden data in unused or reserved fields of the IPv6 header or its
extension headers ([Lucena et al. 2006] lists 8 hiding techniques for the Re-
served/Unused pattern in IPv6)
4. Utilize unused bits in the TCP header [Handel and Sandford 1996]
5. Utilize the ICMP echo payload [Stødle 2009; daemon9 1997]
6. Utilize the padding field of IEEE 802.3 [Wolf 1989; Jankowski et al. 2010]
7. Utilize unused fields in the BACnet header [Wendzel et al. 2012]
8. Place hidden data behind the string termination symbol in the sname and file
fields of DHCP [Rios et al. 2012]
9. Place hidden information into the Differentiated Services (DS) field of outbound
IPSec connections [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
10. Insert hidden data into the IP Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) field in
IPSec connections [Sadeghi et al. 2012].
P8. Inter-arrival Time Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel alters timing intervals between network PDUs (inter-
arrival times) to encode hidden data.
Context: Network Covert Timing Channels
Evidence:
1. Alter the timings between LAN frames sent [Girling 1987]
2. Alter the response time of a HTTP server [Esser 2005]
3. Alter the timings between BACnet/IP packets [Wendzel et al. 2012]
4. Introduce artificial delays into inter-arrival times of SSH packets sent based on
keyboard input (interactive shell) [Shah et al. 2006]
5. Acknowledge IEEE 802.2 I-format frames immediately or after a second I-
format frame was received [Wolf 1989]
6. A man-in-the-middle (MitM) adversary in the public network between two VPN-
secured sites modifies the inter-arrival times of packets transferred between two
man-in-the-edge (MitE) systems on each site of the VPN to signal hidden data to
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both MitE adversaries [Herzberg and Shulman 2013].
7. Alternatively to (6), the MitE systems communicate covertly by sending traffic
with manipulated inter-arrival times to each other [Sadeghi et al. 2012; Herzberg
and Shulman 2013].
8. Record a legitimate traffic sequence, partition the sequence and replay the inter-
arrival times of a particular partition [Cabuk 2006]
P9. Rate Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel sender alters the data rate of a traffic flow from itself
or a third party to the covert channel receiver.
Alias: Throughput Pattern
Context: Network Covert Timing Channels
Evidence:
1. Exhaust the performance of a switch to affect the throughput of a connection
from a third party to a covert channel receiver over time [Li et al. 2011]
2. Manipulate the serial communication port’s throughput by delaying Clear to
Send/Ready to Send commands [Handel and Sandford 1996]
3. Directly alter the data rate of a legitimate channel between a covert channel
sender and receiver.
P10. PDU Order Pattern:
Illustration: The covert channel encodes data using a synthetic PDU order for a given
number of PDUs flowing between covert sender and receiver.
Context: Network Covert Timing Channels
Evidence:
1. Modify the order of IPSec Authentication header (AH) packets [Ahsan and
Kundur 2002]
2. Modify the order of IPSec Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP) packets [Ahsan
and Kundur 2002]
3. Modify the order of TCP packets [Luo et al. 2007; El-Atawy and Al-Shaer 2009].
4. A MitM adversary in the public network between two VPN-secured sites
modifies the order of packets transferred between two MitE systems on each
site of the VPN to signal hidden data to both MitE adversaries [Herzberg and
Shulman 2013].
5. Like (4), modify the order of IPSec packets for inbound or outbound VPN traffic
[Sadeghi et al. 2012].
6. A covert channel sender transfers frames in a way they are sent before or after
a legitimate user’s frames in CSMA/CD networks. The covert channel receiver
analyzes the order of arriving frames [Handel and Sandford 1996].
P11. Re-Transmission Pattern:
Illustration: A covert channel re-transmits previously sent or received PDUs.
Context: Network Covert Timing Channels
Evidence:
1. Transfer selected DNS requests once/twice to encode a hidden bit per request.
2. Duplicate selected IEEE 802.11 packets [Kraetzer et al. 2006]
3. Encode hidden data by re-transmitting selected TCP segments.
4. Do not acknowledge received packets in order to force the covert sender to re-
transmit a packet. The re-transmitted packet is modified by the sender to carry
hidden data [Mazurczyk et al. 2011].
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4.3. Taxonomy/Classification
We provide a hierarchical view of the discovered patterns in order to structure our
findings. The hierarchy is visualized in Fig. 2 where white boxes represent categories
of patterns and gray boxes represent patterns. Conforming to the PLML standard, a
covert channel pattern can also be a child pattern of a parent pattern, as in case of the
Case pattern.
The major categorization of all network covert channels is into timing and storage
channels. We introduce additional sub-categories for storage channels due to their di-
versity. We distinguish between storage channels which apply hiding methods to pay-
load (e.g. to audio streaming) – these channels are outside of our scope – and storage
channels which alter non-payload (e.g. header elements or padding bits). These non-
payload modifying channels do either change or preserve the structure of a PDU – a
novel difference we discovered in the analysis process.
In case of a structure modification, a pattern either alters the order of elements in
the protocol header or it changes the size of the PDU. We discovered different patterns
for both variants. On the other hand, if a pattern preserves the structure of a PDU, the
pattern must modify a data element in the PDU (e.g. a header field).
Network Covert Channels
Covert Timing Channels Covert Storage Channels






(e.g. Headers or Padding)
Structure Modifying Structure Preserving
P2.a. Position P2.b. Number of Elements
P1. Size Modulation P2. Sequence P3. Add Redundancy
Modification of an
Attribute





Fig. 2. Network covert channel pattern hierarchy, excluding hiding techniques utilizing payload
Besides the given hierarchical representation, Tab. II categorizes all patterns re-
garding the following additional aspects:
— Semantic: The semantic of a PDU is changed if the pattern modifies header ele-
ments in a way that leads to a different interpretation of the PDU. For instance,
the semantic of an IPv4 header is changed if a “record route” option is attached but
preserved if the reserved flag is set as the reserved flag does not lead to a changed in-
terpretation of the packet. In general, a channel raises less attention if the semantic
of network data is not modified.
— Syntax: We call a modification of the PDU structure a syntax modification. For
instance, adding additional header elements changes the PDU structure. As with
the semantic, a covert channel pattern can either modify or preserve the syntax.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 0, No. 0, Article 1, Publication date: 2014.
1:14 S. Wendzel, S. Zander et al.
The syntax categorization is only applied to storage channels as timing channels do
not change the structure of a PDU.
— Noise: In general, noise in the form of bit corruptions or packet loss can affect all
presented patterns. Here we only categorize a pattern as noisy if the channel is
a timing channel and thus, always faces noise, or if it is embedded in PDU fields
which are modified in the network (like the TTL in the IPv4 header). Although active
wardens can introduce additional noise in many patterns (e.g. by removing IPv4
options used to carry hidden data), we do not take normalization effects into account.
Table II. Categorization of Covert Channel Patterns
Semantic Syntax (Structure) Noise
preserving modifying preserving modifying noisy noiseless
Storage Channel Patterns
P1. Size Modulation X X Xb
P2. Sequence Xa X X
P2.a. Position Xa X X
P2.b. Number of Elements X X X
P3. Add Redundancy X X X
P4. PDU Corruption/Loss -e -e X X
P5. Random Value X X X
P6. Value Modulation X X Xf Xf
P6.a. Case X X X
P6.b. LSB X X X
P7. Reserved/Unused Xc Xc X X
Timing Channel Patterns
P8. Inter-arrival Time X - - X
P9. Rate X - - X
P10. PDU Order Xd Xd - - X
P11. Re-Transmission X - - X
aThe semantic of Sequence and Position patterns is only preserved if an utilized element’s position or the
sequence of elements have no effect on the PDU’s semantic.
bFragmentation can cause noise for channels using the Size Modulation pattern since routers can fragment
large packets into multiple smaller packets.
cThe semantic of a PDU can change if the covert channel modifies currently unused elements (e.g. a set DF
flag in the IPv4 header would prevent fragmentation). On the other hand, a utilization of currently unused
elements can preserve the semantic, e.g. if the covert channel sets the MF flag in IPv4 to zero, the modification
of the Fragment Offset will not lead to a changed semantic.
dIf the channel utilizes a protocol that provides packet sorting at the receiver side, the PDU Order pattern
can preserve the semantic of the data transfer, otherwise it can change the semantic.
eIntentionally corrupted PDUs are not interpreted and thus do neither change nor preserve the semantic of
a PDU.
fA value modulation can lead to noise (e.g. if the IP TTL is used) but can also be noiseless (e.g. if the source
address is modulated).
4.4. Occurrence Rate of Particular Patterns
Besides the fact that we were able to ‘reduce’ the 109 hiding techniques to only 11 pat-
terns, our findings also show that the majority (76 of 109 or 69.7%) of hiding techniques
is based on only four patterns, namely the Reserved/Unused pattern (24 techniques),
the Add Redundancy pattern (21 techniques), the Value Modulation pattern (21 tech-
niques, including its child patterns Case and LSB), and the Random Value pattern
(10 techniques). In other words, many of the surveyed and analyzed techniques are of
relatively little novelty as they are based on existing techniques. Fig. 3 compares the
number of covert channel techniques associated with the particular patterns.
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Fig. 3. Number of associated covert channel techniques per covert channel pattern. Shaded bars represent
child patterns.
It would be interesting to compare the occurrence rate of patters in the literature
with their actual number of uses in practice. However, no information about the usage
rates of covert channels are available.
4.5. Extensibility of the Pattern Catalog
The patterns introduced in our work will be made available publicly online in a moder-
ated wiki. A wiki allows the collaboration among experts from both, research institu-
tions and industry: it allows active discussion and, through moderation, the controlled
extension and modification of the pattern catalog.
If a novel hiding technique requires the integration of a new pattern, researchers can
add the pattern to the catalog, which will be invisible until accepted by the modera-
tors. The acceptance may be performed after detailed discussion with the contributing
researchers to ensure the wiki’s accurate and consistent state with the existing pat-
tern collection and to prevent future contributors from wrongly classifying their “new”
covert channel techniques as new patterns. Moreover, researchers can add upcoming
hiding techniques that are based on an already existing pattern to the evidence prop-
erty of the particular pattern.
5. VARIATION OF COVERT CHANNEL PATTERNS
Covert channels are not only used for malicious purposes (e.g. the control of botnets)
but are also used to support the freedom of speech (e.g. of journalists). Furthermore,
research on covert channel improvements enables the further development of neces-
sary countermeasures against malicious users; the research community must identify
improvements for covert channel techniques before malicious users take advantage of
them.
We will now describe the variation of the patterns defined in the previous section. A
pattern variation automatically adapts a pattern to a new context. In case of network
covert channels, we define the utilized network protocol, used as carrier for the hidden
data, as the context. If the channel switches the protocol, the context changes as well
and thus, the pattern must be adapted to the new context. For instance, a pattern that
was previously applied to hide data in IPv4 can be adjusted to hide data in IPv6.
A pattern variation is only useful if it is an automatic process for both, the sender
and the receiver. The automatic process generates new code that implements the pat-
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Fig. 4. Concept of Covert Channel Pattern Variation
tern for the altered context. Thus, a pattern variation eliminates the necessity of pro-
gramming a pattern from scratch if it needs to be adapted to another network protocol.
Fig. 4 visualizes the concept of a covert channel pattern variation: While a general
network protocol implementation is required to hide data within a protocol or the pro-
tocol’s timing behavior, a pattern has information which enable the application of the
pattern to other network protocols.
5.1. PLML-based Pattern Variation
Our approach is similar to that of Engel et al. who store the information required for
a pattern transformation within the implementation property of PLML [Engel et al.
2011; Engel et al. 2013]. We introduce so called settings into the implementation prop-
erty. These settings contain all significant information for a variation.
Engel et al. define a configuration for each context of a pattern [Engel et al. 2013].
We match this aspect as well by introducing specific settings for each supported overt
network protocol. For instance, a protocol A may provide 4 bits of space for a pattern
and the location of the bits is at an offset of 6 bits from the first bit of the header.
In the new context of protocol B, the pattern can only use 3 bits and these 3 bits are
located at an offset of 20 bits from the first bit of protocol B’s header. In other words,
each variation of a pattern highly depends on the utilized network protocol. Given a
very simple hiding technique that just utilizes a single bit and sets it to “1” or “0” in
an arbitrary protocol with a static header structure, the variation would just need an
“offset” value for each protocol to locate the selected bit in its header.
Figure 5 shows example settings for the Random Value pattern. For IPv4, these
settings would utilize the 16 bit Identifier field and for TCP, the 32 bit ISN would be
used. As the ISN is only random in the first packet of a flow, a limitation (OnlyFirstPkt)
must be enforced.
We found that the following settings can be necessary for covert channel patterns –
depending on the particular pattern:
— Offset: Number of bits between the first bit of the protocol header and the first bit of
the utilized area
— Len: Size of the utilized area
— OnlyFirstPkt: Only use the first packet of a flow (e.g. for the TCP ISN)
— Min/MaxSize: Minimum/maximum size of a (padding) field or of a frame
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Fig. 5. Settings for IPv4 and TCP in case of the Random Value Pattern
— Min/MaxElements: Minimum/maximum number of elements to use (e.g. minimum
number of IPv4 options or DHCP options for the Position pattern or the Sequence
pattern)
— ValueRange/ValuesAllowed: These fields limit the range of allowed values for a field
and the particular values which can be stored in the field. For instance, the Value
Modulation pattern may only be allowed to place the values “a”-“j” in a field or only
the values “yes”, “no” and “optional”. For passive covert channels, i.e. those piggy-
backing third-party traffic, constraints can be defined in order to allow only limited
modulations. For instance, a constraint can allow only TTL modifications in a range
of +/-1.
— Min/Max/DistributionIPG: Minimum/maximum time difference between packets
or definition of a value distribution for these time differences. While this attribute
is generally useful, it is especially required to configure limits for the Inter-arrival
Time pattern.
— Min/MaxRate: Minimum/maximum packet rate. This attribute is similar to the
Min/MaxIPG attribute but configures the number of PDUs the channel is allowed to
transfer per time t. The attribute is of general use but especially required to config-
ure the limits for the PDU Order pattern to ensure stealthiness. In future work rate
profiles could be defined as well in order to match the actual traffic behavior as close
as possible.
While the actual hiding technique of a pattern can be adapted automatically, proto-
cols with header fields which depend on other header fields still require the additional
use of libraries and tools like scapy1. For instance, the calculation of the IPv4 Check-
sum as well as the adjustment of the Internet header length and total length fields
are not included in the pattern variation process and must be done additionally. We
therefore decided to include scapy commands into our settings as scapy automatically
calculates values for header fields the user does not not explicitly define. Thus, the
use of scapy eliminates the need to implement a variation’s utilized network protocols.
Therefore, additional settings must be defined in the form settings.protocol.value=bit
value,scapystring=command.
Figure 6 shows a sample setup for assigning two bit values to two different protocols
(IPv4 and IPv6) of the LSB pattern using scapy strings. A high and a low value are
assigned to TTL or Hop Limit in order to transfer a “0” (value=0) or a “1” (value=1) bit.
In order to prevent a trivial detection of the channel, the values are randomized in a
higher/lower range.
Like our pattern catalog, the settings proposed for pattern variation also serve as
a basis for future work, i.e. they can be extended by adding additional settings in the
future.
1http://www.secdev.org/projects/scapy/
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settings.ipv4.value=0, scapystring=IP(ttl =100+ RandInt ()%50);
settings.ipv4.value=1, scapystring=IP(ttl =150+ RandInt ()%50);
settings.ipv6.value=0, scapystring=IPv6(hlim =100+ RandInt ()%50);
settings.ipv6.value=1, scapystring=IPv6(hlim =150+ RandInt ()%50);
Fig. 6. Sample tuples using scapy strings for the LSB pattern
5.2. Requirements-based Pattern Variation
Pattern variation is also applicable in the context of situational requirements. For in-
stance, the transfer of a video stream over a covert channel requires a higher through-
put than the transfer of a password within the same time.
Each overt channel (the utilized network protocol) provides a particular amount of
space to carry hidden data and has a different potential to raise attention [Wendzel
and Keller 2011]. A pattern variation for a given requirement can thus also switch the
overt channel used in order to provide a high throughput or a high covertness. If the
pattern is required to transfer a video stream it may use an overt channel providing
a high throughput while the pattern may use an overt channel with a low throughput
and high covertness if only a few hidden bits must be transferred. Therefore, a pattern
cannot only change the overt channel but can also adjust the number of manipulated
bits in the overt channel.
5.3. Similar Approaches to Pattern Variation
Covert channels can utilize multiple hiding techniques simultaneously [Wendzel and
Keller 2011; Yarochkin et al. 2008]. For instance, one technique could modify the LSB
of the IPv4 TTL while another technique modifies the IPv4 reserved flag.
This section puts patterns in the context of such a simultaneous application of hiding
techniques. To this end, we describe two approaches that utilize multiple patterns in-
stead of multiple hiding techniques, namely pattern combination and pattern hopping.
5.3.1. Pattern Combination. To increase the throughput of a covert channel and its
stealthiness, we can combine multiple patterns, e.g. by applying them in parallel to
a single packet – an idea already shown for single hiding techniques in the field of
network steganography [Fraczek et al. 2012] – or sequentially to subsequent packets.
As an example, consider the parallel application of the Random Value and Add Redun-
dancy patterns: A covert channel sender could modify the Identifier in the IPv4 header
as well as it attaches an IPv4 option used to carry additional hidden data. A parallel
application of a particular set of patterns to a single packet may not always be possi-
ble. In future work we will determine dependencies between patterns so that feasible
pattern combinations can be identified. Much simpler is the sequential application of
different patterns to subsequent packets. For instance, for one packet the Value Mod-
ulation pattern could be used to modify an unused field and LSB value modulation
could be used for another field for the following packet.
5.3.2. Pattern Hopping. Sequential pattern combination uses a simple linear combina-
tion, which could be easily detected. To make detection more difficult, we propose a
simple mechanism based on the concepts of protocol hopping covert channels [Wendzel
and Keller 2011] and synchronized random number generators similar to [Gianvecchio
et al. 2008].
Let P be a set of patterns. The sender S and receiver R agree to use a certain cryp-
tographically secure pseudo-random number generator (CSPRNG) with a certain seed
value V . The agreement on CSPRNG and V has to be done separately over a secure
transmission channel, since the covert communication could be easily uncovered if
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both are known. The sender S and receiver R initialize their CSPRNG with V . Both
CSPRNGs now are synchronized. Let t be the sequential number of the transferred
pattern, incremented each time a packet is being sent (and received). t is initialized
with 0. For example, t could also be the timestamp or the sequence number of a packet
(immutable between S and R). S chooses pi ∈ P where i = CSPRNG(V, t) mod |P | and
applies pi to the actual packet to send. R knows the pattern since R gets t and knows V
and CSPRNG. Thus, the patterns used are randomized. Instead of using a pattern for
each packet we can also increase the modulus so that ‘unmapped’ patterns are ignored
(limiting the bandwidth).
As network packets, and with it, the transfer of covert data, can be error-prone due
to packet loss or re-transmissions caused by transport layer protocols, a reliable com-
munication is a necessity to prevent the de-synchronization of the CSPRNG. To over-
come this synchronization problem, so-called micro protocols can be used, i.e. covert
channel-internal control protocols with reliability features [Ray and Mishra 2008]. Mi-
cro protocols have been well studied over the last years and optimized micro protocols
are available [Wendzel and Keller 2012b; Backs et al. 2012].
Moreover, the selection of patterns can be done with adaptive techniques [Yarochkin
et al. 2008]. Adaptive covert channels dynamically customize the use of covert channel
techniques in order to bypass blocked communications [Yarochkin et al. 2008] and thus
provide a more reliable data transfer. In combination with micro protocols and pattern
hopping, adaptive covert channels could not only switch between network protocols
but between patterns in case a technique or pattern will be administratively blocked.
While it is comparably easy to block a specific covert channel technique, it is more
challenging to eliminate a covert channel that switches to a different pattern if one
pattern was blocked, as this requires implementing countermeasures against multiple
patterns.
6. COUNTERMEASURES
Protection techniques for covert channels either aim on eliminating a covert channel,
limiting a channel’s capacity or detecting a covert channel [Zander et al. 2007]. The re-
search community considers covert channel protection a challenging task [Gianvecchio
and Wang 2007] and due to the large number of existing covert channel techniques, it
is currently difficult to counter all covert channels in practice.
Previous approaches only targeted selected covert channels in a given network pro-
tocol. The introduction of patterns which comprise a generic description of a hiding
technique enables a more practical approach to develop countermeasures for a whole
set of hiding techniques linked to the same pattern. As our 11 patterns represent at
least the 109 discussed covert channel techniques, a comparably small number of ap-
proaches would be enough to counter these covert channel techniques. Thus, the inte-
gration of pattern-based countermeasures will lead to a significant reduction of neces-
sary protection mechanisms in practice.
On the other hand, some specific countermeasures may be more effective than a
more general technique that can counter all covert channels associated with a partic-
ular pattern. For instance, some countermeasures are optimized for detecting hidden
data in a header field of a particular protocol. The direct adaption of such a counter-
measure to another network protocol, where the particular header field is linked to a
different value distribution, may lead to a lower detection accuracy. Therefore, counter-
measures for patterns require a variation (analog to Sect. 5) as well in order to adapt
them to particular network protocols.
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6.1. Countermeasures for Patterns
In order to evaluate the applicability of existing countermeasures to patterns, we fo-
cused on countermeasures covered by the surveys of Llamas et al. [Llamas et al. 2005]
and Zander et al. [Zander et al. 2007]. Our evaluation does not include measures that
focus on local covert channels (e.g. the fuzzy time approach [Hu 1991]) or on the preven-
tion of covert channels at the time of system development (e.g. the shared resource ma-
trix methodology or covert flow trees [Kemmerer 1983; Porras and Kemmerer 1991]).
In particular, we considered traffic normalization, the network pump, statistical ap-
proaches, and machine learning approaches.
6.1.1. Traffic Normalization (TN). Traffic normalizers remove ambiguities and policy-
breaking elements in network traffic, , which makes them effective especially against
storage channel patterns. The application of normalizers results in side-effects as
the normalization of PDU headers often includes setting header fields to default
values, i.e. these fields are not usable anymore [Handley et al. 2001]. Existing traffic
normalizers are, for instance, the network-aware active warden [Lewandowski et al.
2007], the Snort normalizer [Snort Project 2012], and norm [Handley et al. 2001]
which, taken together, provide more than 100 normalization techniques. Literature
divides normalizers into stateless and stateful normalizers. Stateless normalizers focus
on one packet at a time, and they do not take previous packets into account, while
stateful normalizers cache information of previously received packets to evaluate
traffic in a more advanced manner and can also detect more covert channels, as shown
in [Lucena et al. 2006].
For always legitimate values (e.g. allowed values for the IPv4 protocol field or al-
lowed destination addresses in LAN frames), the creation of normalization rules is
challenging and linked to constrictive side-effects [Fisk et al. 2003], which makes
normalization ineffective against different forms of the Value Modulation pattern2.
A problem of traffic normalizers is their limited buffer size [Handley et al. 2001]:
Buffers cache packets of data flows to re-assemble these flows. Normalization tech-
niques which require large buffers, for instance, to re-order network packets (PDU
Order pattern) or to normalize the inter-arrival timings and data rate (Inter-arrival
Time pattern and Rate pattern), are only useful as long as the normalizer’s resources
are not exhausted. Another problem, especially in IP networks, is that traffic can take
different routes and thus, not all packets of a connection pass a normalizer which
can result in incomplete information about connections (e.g. missed packets of TCP
handshakes [Handley et al. 2001]).
Traffic normalization can only be applied to all network traffic (‘blind’ normalization)
if the normalization is transparent (it does not affect the traffic significantly). Hence,
blind normalization cannot eliminate all covert channels. However, if accurate de-
tection methods exist, detected covert channels can be eliminated or limited using
targeted normalization or even disruptive measures, e.g. the overt traffic could simply
be blocked.
6.1.2. Network Pump and Related Concepts (NPRC). Techniques to limit the capacity of
network covert timing channels based on the Inter-arrival Time and Rate patterns (e.g.
the pump [Kang and Moskowitz 1993] and the ACK filter [Ogurtsov et al. 1996]) are
traffic normalizers as well. These countermeasures either prevent the entire data flow
from HIGH to LOW or do only allow the transmission of acknowledgement messages
from HIGH to LOW (related to a data flow from LOW to HIGH).
2On the other hand, normalizers can eliminate TTL-based covert channels as described in [Zander et al.
2006] by setting the TTL value of all packets to the same value.
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Another approach presented by Wendzel and Keller [Wendzel and Keller 2012a] limits
the covert channel discussed in [Wendzel and Zander 2012] (Value Modulation pattern)
which encodes hidden information in the sequence of utilized network protocols. The
approach is called a protocol switching-aware active warden (PCAW) and introduces
delays on protocol switches.
As in the case of traffic normalization, buffer sizes and routing effects limit the capa-
bilities of the NPRC approaches.
6.1.3. Statistical Approaches (SA). The detection of covert timing channels based on
inter-arrival times was achieved by Cabuk et al. [Cabuk et al. 2009] by representing
recorded, rounded inter-arrival times as strings. The strings are compressed and the
compressibility of a string is used as an indicator for the presence of a covert timing
channel. The method takes advantage of the fact that covert timing channels gener-
ate traffic with a few characteristic inter-arrival times to signal the different covert
bits and thus, result in a few similar strings which can be compressed more efficiently
than normal random inter-arrival times. Cabuk et al. presented two additional statis-
tical approaches, one based on the calculation of the -similarity and another based on
the standard deviation of recorded inter-arrival times [Cabuk et al. 2009].
Berk et al. developed another detection approach for inter-arrival time channels [Berk
et al. 2005]. Their technique uses the fact that timing channels generate inter-arrival
time distributions that differ from inter-arrival time distributions of normal applica-
tion traffic. Gianvecchio and Wang showed that covert timing channels can be detected
with high accuracy by analyzing the entropy of inter-arrival times [Gianvecchio and
Wang 2007].
While statistical approaches have been effective primarily against channels based
on the Inter-arrival Time pattern and the Random Value pattern, their application to
all other patterns is thinkable, since the use of all covert channels leads to changes of
statistical value distributions.
6.1.4. Machine Learning (ML). Covert channels can be detected using supervised ML
approaches where some statistical features are used to characterize covert channels
and normal traffic. Classifier models are then trained based on provided examples of
features of covert channels and normal traffic. Sohn et al. demonstrated that simple
covert channels encoded in the IP ID or TCP ISN field can be discovered with high ac-
curacy by Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [Sohn et al. 2003]. Tumoian et al. showed
that a neural network can detect Rutkowska’s TCP ISN covert channel [Rutkowska
2004] with high accuracy [Tumoian and Anikeev 2005] (both Random Value pattern).
Zander et al. demonstrated that inter-packet timing channels can be detected by C4.5
decision trees trained on several features [Zander et al. 2011] (Inter-arrival Time pat-
tern). Wendzel and Zander showed that C4.5 decision trees also detect simple protocol
switching channels (Value Modulation pattern) with high accuracy [Wendzel and Zan-
der 2012]. Besides the mentioned patterns, the application of ML to detect all other
patterns appears possible.
6.1.5. Applicability of Countermeasures. Tab. III summarizes our findings on the appli-
cability of the discussed countermeasures in the context of covert channel patterns.
We did not only take existing applications of countermeasures but also potential ap-
plications into account, since no pattern-specific implementations are available yet. In
general, the prevention of covert channels is always feasible if all traffic is blocked
but such approaches are not applicable in practice or demand a high-quality covert
channel detection. Therefore, Tab. III does not cover techniques which block the entire
traffic.
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Table III. Application of Covert Channel Countermeasures to Patterns
Elimination Limitation Detection
Storage Channel Patterns
P1. Size Modulation SA/ML
P2. Sequence TN SA/ML
P2.a. Position TN SA/ML
P2.b. Number of Elements TN SA/ML
P3. Add Redundancy TN SA/ML
P4. PDU Corruption/Loss TN SA/ML
P5. Random Value TN SA/ML
P6. Value Modulation TN (limited), SA/ML
NPRC
P6.a. Case TN SA/ML
P6.b. LSB TN SA/ML
P7. Reserved/Unused TN SA/ML
Timing Channel Patterns
P8. Inter-arrival Time TN (limited), SA/ML
NPRC
P9. Rate TN (limited), SA/ML
NPRC
P10. PDU Order TN (limited) SA/ML
NPRC
P11. Re-Transmission SA/ML
6.2. Illustration: Traffic Normalization
Although traffic normalization was never discussed in the context of covert chan-
nel patterns, the existing normalizers already have pattern-oriented capabilities. As
dozens of normalization techniques exist, we will discuss only selected ones to show
that pattern-oriented countermeasures are feasible.
For instance, existing normalizers can replace the TTL of IPv4 packets with a fixed
value to eliminate covert channels. Traffic normalizers can apply the same technique
to counter covert channels in the IPv6 hop limit field. The technique thus counters
the LSB pattern even in case of a pattern variation to different network protocols. The
LSB pattern could also be applied to the BACnet NPDU hop count field — no new
normalization technique must be implemented for the same pattern.
Fisk et al. mention general cases for the application of traffic normalization [Fisk
et al. 2003]. For instance, unused fields can be cleared (Reserved/Unused pattern);
decreasing fields (like the TTL) can be set to fixed values (LSB pattern and Value
Modulation pattern); and derivate fields (i.e. those depending on other fields, like the
Checksum or the Internet Header Length in IPv4) can be re-placed with correct values
or the particular packets can be dropped (PDU Corruption/Loss pattern). Such general
applications of normalization rules can be used in a protocol-independent manner and
are thus capable of countering a whole set of hiding techniques which are based on the
same pattern.
6.3. Illustration: Protocol Switching-aware Active Warden
The aforementioned PCAW [Wendzel and Keller 2012a] introduces delays on protocol
switches and thus limits the bitrate of covert channels that signal hidden information
through the use of particular network protocols. As shown in [Wendzel and Keller
2012a], the PCAW cannot only be successfully applied to protocol switching covert
channels based on IPv4 but also to building automation networks using BACnet and
thus exemplifies the variation of countermeasures as well.
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7. CONCLUSION
We evaluated 109 network covert channel techniques from the last decades and ex-
tracted abstract patterns from these techniques. We were able to represent all 109
techniques by 11 patterns which we arranged in a hierarchical catalog based on the
Pattern Language Markup Language (PLML). Moreover, we showed that the majority
of these techniques can be reduced to only four different patterns – evidence that many
network covert channel techniques invented represent very similar techniques.
The pattern catalog will be provided on-line in order to allow the scientific commu-
nity to modify and extend the covert channel pattern collection in a moderated process.
Our catalog eases the novelty evaluation of future covert channel techniques.
We presented the concept of pattern variation for covert channels. Pattern varia-
tion allows the automatic adaption of a generic hiding technique to different network
protocols without requiring a re-implementation of the technique itself. Since covert
channels are a dual-use good, we also introduced the pattern-based approaches pat-
tern hopping and pattern combination to improve the throughput and stealthiness of
covert channels.
If prevention approaches counter generic patterns instead of hiding techniques, the
number of necessary countermeasures is greatly reduced. Under the assumption that
future techniques for covert channels will often fall into one of the existing pattern
categories, the value of our pattern-based approach increases even further. To this
end, the implementation and evaluation of pattern-based countermeasures in practice
is considered important future work.
Additional future work will comprise the generation of a PLML-based pattern cata-
log for local covert channels and for payload-based hiding techniques.
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